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Economists have studied many facets of tax evasion. Two facts about this strand of literature are
notable. First, recently scholars widely recognise that morale considerations (or social norms)
are key to explain compliance behaviour.1 Second, a comparable aspect of cheating on the state,
namely beneﬁt fraud, has gained hardly any attention.
Naturally, social norms play a major role in certain decisions that individuals make, while
in other decisions economic incentives seem to be the driving force. Given that the neo-classical
model of tax evasion underpredicts real-world compliance (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992),
many scholars (see, for instance, Andreoni et al., 1998; Posner, 2000) conclude that citizens are
not motivated purely by the rate of return on tax evasion, but also by morale aspects. As a
consequence, an increasing number of papers are interested in the determinants of this social
norm called tax morale. All these papers – explicitly or implicitly – assume that tax morale
aﬀects actual tax evasion. As discussed in a survey by Halla (2011), the empirical identiﬁcation
of such a causal link is, however, quite challenging, since exogenous variation in tax morale
is needed. Most recently, Halla (forthcoming) suggests that the inherited part of tax morale of
American-born from their ancestors country of origin provides such an exogenous variation which
can be used within an instrumental variable setting. His analysis identiﬁes a negative eﬀect of
higher tax morale on the size of the underground production. While further empirical evidence
on the causal link between social norms to comply an the respective compliance behaviour is
needed, there seems to be wide consensus that tax morale is at least part of the answer to the
famous question ‘Why do people pay taxes?’ (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992).
The literature on beneﬁt fraud (with and without consideration of social norms) is in contrast
quite small.2 To the extent that there is a widespread concern about abuse and dishonesty in
social welfare and health care programmes this is a quite surprising fact.3 A possible explanation
for the relative neglect of beneﬁt fraud in the economic literature is given by the fact that tax
evasion and beneﬁt fraud are almost identical in the standard neo-classical model of compliance
1We use social norm and morale consideration (or motivation) synonymously. For a general discussion of social
norms, see Elster (1989).
2While the literature on beneﬁt fraud can be summarized in the following, a survey of the literature on tax
evasion is well beyond the scope of this paper. The development of the literature through the 1980si ss u r v e y e db y
Cowell (1990). More recent literature surveys are provided by Andreoni et al. (1998)a n dSlemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002). For a review on the literature on the underground economy, which exists in part as a means of tax evasion,
see Schneider and Enste (2000). A survey of the literature on tax morale is given by Torgler (2002, 2003).
3The most prominent anti-fraud measure is the US False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA dating back to 1863 is
intended to encourage citizens to come forward with information and assist authorities in uncovering any kind of
fraud against government, with the exception of tax evasion.
2(Halla and Schneider, 2008). The existing theoretical papers that explicitly focus on beneﬁt
fraud are Yaniv (1986)a n dBurgess (1992). Both papers model the abuse of unemployment
insurance (e.g. recipients who work or avoid job-search activities) and discuss various penalty
schemes, as well as optimal deterrence policies.4 The empirical literature contains some empirical
studies identifying fraud in diﬀerent U.S. social welfare programs.5 Finally, a small number of
papers examine the social norm to abstain from cheating via beneﬁt fraud (typical called beneﬁt
morale) explicitly so far. These papers mainly focus on determinants of beneﬁt morale on
a country level. Heinemann (2008); Halla et al. (2010) ﬁnd that high levels of public social
spending and a high unemployment rate are associated with small positive (or no) immediate
impact on beneﬁt morale, which is (partly) crowded out by adverse medium and long run eﬀects.
Heinemann (2011) shows further that sharp increases in the unemployment rate reduce beneﬁt
morale especially in countries with generous beneﬁt schemes.
In this paper, we also deﬁne the concept of beneﬁt and tax morale as the morale motivation
to abstain from cheating on the state via beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion, respectively. Our main
contribution is to examine these moral motivations within one framework that interprets them
as moral consumption goods. We derive straightforward testable hypotheses on whether their
demand is determined by price and wealth eﬀects. In order to capture the price of these non-
market goods we employ individual level factors (such as labour market status and income), as
well as country level factors (such as tax rates and the level of public social spending). The direct
comparison of tax morale and beneﬁt morale is especially useful, since a change in certain factors
(such as, for instance, income) should aﬀect the demand for these two goods with opposite signs.
Employing a large micro data set from the European and World Values Survey, combined with
information from the OECD Database, we provide robust evidence that the demand responds
to our price proxy variables as predicted by theory. For instance, beneﬁt morale improves with
rising income while tax morale deteriorates with rising income. The main general conclusions of
this paper is that social norms (which are among scholars widely accepted as determinants of
individual economic behaviour) are themselves inﬂuenced by economic factors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section2 we discuss the concept of beneﬁt and tax
4Relatedly, Baumann et al. (2009)m o d e le m p l o y e e ’ se v a s i o nd e c i s i o n sr e g a r d i n gc o n t r i b u t i o n st ot h eu n e m -
ployment insurance.
5Greenberg et al. (1981); Greenberg and Halsey (1983)e x a m i n ep r o g r a m ss i m i l a rt oan e g a t i v e - i n c o m et a x
plan and ﬁnd substantial income underreporting for up to 50 percent of certain subgroups of the population.
Similarly Kingston et al. (1986) identify frequent overpayments in unemployment insurance systems, indicating
that many claimants falsely certify that they have actively sought a job. Studies analyzing the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and Food Stamps entitlement programs ﬁnd more modest fraud rates of 2 to 4 percent
(Wolf and Greenberg, 1986).
3morale and derive testable hypotheses. Section3 and 4 describe the dependent and independent
variables, respectively. Our empirical strategy is outlined in Section5. The estimation results are
presented in Section6, and Section7 reports on several robustness checks. Finally, in Section8 we
conclude the paper. A Web Appendix (downloadable from the corresponding author’s website)
provides all details on data sources and further results.
2 Beneﬁt and tax morale
We deﬁne beneﬁt and tax morale as the morale motivation to abstain from cheating on the state
via beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion, respectively. Empirically we capture these morale motivations
based on survey data. Theoretically we think of beneﬁt and tax morale as morale consumption
goods.6 Citizens who fully comply with the beneﬁt law (tax code) consume a high level of beneﬁt
morale (tax morale). Considering a standard utility formulation, demand should be determined
by prices and income. In the case of moral goods, which are by deﬁnition non-market goods,
prices are however not directly observable. In order to test whether the demand for beneﬁt and
tax morale is aﬀected by prices, we approximate their prices with individual level and country
level characteristics along which the opportunity cost of consumption vary. In particular, we
formulate hypotheses for four diﬀerent proxy variables.
First, we argue that employment status is a useful proxy variable for the price of beneﬁt and
tax morale. Non-employed citizens (i.e. those out of the labour force or unemployed) face a
tax morale price of zero.7 By deﬁnition they earn no labour income and consuming a high level
of tax morale (i.e. full compliance with the income tax) does not aﬀect purchasing power. In
contrast, an employed citizen incurs costs by consuming tax morale. S/he faces a price strictly
larger than zero. Consequently, non-employed citizens will (compared to the employed) demand
a higher quantity of tax morale, and we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Non-employed citizens demand more tax morale compared to em-
ployed ones.
In the case of beneﬁt morale both groups pay a strictly positive price. By consuming an additional
unit of beneﬁt morale they clearly forgo consumption of other goods. However, it is reasonable
that employed citizens face a lower price than their non-employed counterparts. For instance,
6For a discussion of morale goods in the context of the cognitive dissonance theory, see Östling (2009).
7We focus here on income taxes, and abstract from the tax evasion of consumption and capital taxes. In our
empirical analysis we will, however, control for the taxation of income, capital and consumption
4being out of the labour force (or unemployed) implies in many cases eligibility for many types of
beneﬁts, such as housing subsidy. Given that one is eligible, the temptation to claim unjustiﬁed
higher beneﬁts may be higher (and the costs lower) than if one were not eligible in a ﬁrst place.
Therefore, we suppose that non-employed citizens will demand a lower quantity of beneﬁt morale
compared to employed citizens:
Hypothesis 1b: Non-employed citizens demand less beneﬁt morale compared to em-
ployed ones.
Second, we consider income. The opportunity cost (i.e. the price) of consuming a high level
of beneﬁt and tax morale vary with income. We argue that price of beneﬁt morale decreases
with income, while the price of tax morale increases with income. A high-income household has
few opportunities to commit beneﬁt fraud. Such a household faces a higher probability of being
caught for beneﬁt fraud compared to a household at the bottom of the income distribution.
The rich household will typically have to pretend eligibility ﬁrst, while the eligible low-income
household may simply claim higher beneﬁts. A rich household could also expect a higher ﬁne if
convicted. In other words, for high-income households beneﬁt fraud is comparably less proﬁtable,
thus they face a relatively low price of beneﬁt morale. By equivalent reasoning, one can deduce
that low-income households face low cost of tax morale; where the most obvious case is given by
low-income households who do not pay income taxes at all.
As usual, the demand response to a change in price can be divided into a substitution eﬀect
and an income eﬀect. Since, our price variable of interest is income, a price change entails (besides
the usual substitution and income eﬀect) also an actual change in income. This actual change
in income may also aﬀect demand and augment the standard income eﬀect. The substitution
eﬀect is as as always negative (i.e. demand decreases in its own price). In contrast, the sign of
the income eﬀect(s) is ap r i o r iambiguous. In other words, beneﬁt and tax morale could either
be normal or inferior goods, and demand could either increase or decrease in response to an
exogenous wealth shock. Clearly, it is hard to test this empirically. However, our survey data
allows us to estimate the eﬀect of a variation in a proxy variable for wealth on beneﬁt and tax
morale while controlling for income. That means, we can observe a wealth shock while keeping
the substitution eﬀect constant. Our estimation results (detailed estimation output is provided
in SectionA.1 of the Web Appendix) suggest that the demand for both goods increases as a
response to a positive wealth shock, and therefore both goods should be normal goods. This
corresponds to the idea that wealth provides greater opportunity to behave morally (Shleifer,
52004).
Assuming normality of beneﬁt morale the prediction on the eﬀect of income on its demand is
unambiguous (substitution and income eﬀect go in the same direction) and we hypothesize that
an increase in income increases the demand for beneﬁt morale
Hypothesis 2a: An increase in income increases the demand for beneﬁt morale.
In the case of normality of tax morale, substitution and income eﬀect counteract and the predic-
tion is unclear. If the substitution (income) eﬀect dominates we expect tax morale to decrease
(increase) with income:
Hypothesis 2b (null): The substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, and an
increase in income decreases the demand for tax morale.
Hypothesis 2b (alternative): The income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, and
an increase in income increases the demand for tax morale.
If both goods were inferior goods, the prediction would be ambiguous for beneﬁt morale and
clear for tax morale. Depending on whether the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect
or vice versa, the demand for beneﬁt morale could increase or decrease. The demand for tax
morale in contrast should go up as income rises.
There is a wide range of policy measures that may aﬀect the prices of beneﬁt and tax morale.
In this paper we focus on two ﬁscal policy measures, the tax burden and public social spending.
Both variables are emphasized in the tax evasion literature and are available on an internationally
comparable level. For both cases, we derive a hypothesis on their eﬀect on beneﬁt and tax morale.
Tax burden – Most of the theoretical models of tax evasion fail to provide a clear predic-
tion regarding the eﬀect of a changing tax rate on evasion. The presence of both income and
substitution eﬀects complicates the analysis. Theoretical predictions of the impact of tax rates
on evasion are dependent on modeling assumptions.8 The majority of empirical (e.g. Clotfelter,
1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1986) an experimental analyses (e.g. Friedland et al., 1978; Baldry,
1987; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992), however, report a positive relation between tax rates
and tax evasion. This result is in line with common intuition. With respect to tax morale we
have a clear prediction. A rising tax rate increases the cost of (full) compliance and is, therefore,
equivalent to an increase in the price of tax morale. If tax morale is a normal good, the income
8For instance, in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the relationship between tax rates and
evasion is ambiguous, and depends on speciﬁc assumptions on the shape of risk aversion.
6eﬀect goes in the same direction. Therefore, we expect a lower demand for tax morale in response
to increasing tax rates:
Hypothesis 3a: An increase in the tax rate decreases the demand for tax morale.
In contrast, a changing tax rate does not alter the price of beneﬁt morale per se. Based on this
line of reasoning we expect that the tax burden has no eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. However, given
that beneﬁt morale is a normal good, the income eﬀect (due to the increasing tax rate) should
lower beneﬁt morale:
Hypothesis 3b: An increase in the tax rate decreases the demand for beneﬁt morale.
If beneﬁt and tax morale were inferior goods, the eﬀect of an increasing tax rate on the
demand for tax morale would be ambiguous, and the eﬀect in the demand for beneﬁt morale
positive. An alternative argument (outside the scope of standard consumer theory), could be
based on the idea that tax payers could interpret social beneﬁts as a payment to which they are
entitled because of earlier tax (and social security) contributions. Within such a framework an
increase in the tax rate is equivalent to an increase in citizens contribution and could therefore
reduce (as predicted by Hypothesis 3b) beneﬁt morale.
Public social spending – Equivalent to the reasoning regarding the eﬀect of a rising tax rate
on tax morale, an increase in the subsidy rate (or more generally an increase in generosity of
the welfare state) increases the price of beneﬁt morale. Honest behavior gets more costly as the
generosity of the system increases.9 However, assuming normality of beneﬁt morale, we have a
counteracting income eﬀect; an increase in the subsidy rate generates a positive income eﬀect.
That means, we have for our empirical test (where we capture the generosity of the welfare state
with the size of public social spending) two alternative hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a (null): The substitution eﬀect dominates the income aﬀect, and an
increase in public social spending increases the demand for beneﬁt morale.
Hypothesis 4a (alternative): The income eﬀect dominates the substitution aﬀect, and
an increase in public social spending decreases the demand for beneﬁt morale.
A changing subsidy rate does not alter the price of tax morale. However, given that tax morale is
a normal good, the income eﬀect (due to the increasing subsidy rate) should increase tax morale:
9Lindbeck (e.g. 1995a,b); Lindbeck et al. (e.g. 2003)d i s c u s sd i s i n c e n t i v ee ﬀects of generous welfare payments
in the context of a dynamic interaction between market behavior and political behavior over time.
7Hypothesis 4b: An increase in public social spending increases the demand for tax
morale.
A similar reasoning outside the scope of the of standard consumer theory (as used above) could
endorse this hypothesis. It is often argued that citizens evaluate the tax burden based on what
the states provides in return. In other words, a tax payment can be considered as an individual’s
contribution to a public good. Based on this idea of ﬁscal exchange (Buchanan, 1976), the
nature of public expenditures may aﬀect the willingness to pay taxes. Therefore, the demand
for tax morale should increase with the level of utility that government services and goods
provide. This is supported by empirical (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Frey, 1997)
and experimental (Alm and Jackson, 1993; Alm et al., 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002) evidence
showing that compliance is higher if tax revenues are spent on programs tax payers approve
and if they actively participate in the decision process.10 In general, it is diﬃcult to distinguish
which sub-population of citizens will beneﬁt from a certain public good or service. If citizens
predominantly perceive a generous welfare state as a desirable public good, an increase in public
social spending should improve tax morale.
However, quite plausibly, support for generous welfare state arrangements should vary along
the income distribution. Citizens at the top of the income distribution will typically beneﬁt less
from a generous welfare state. As a consequence, one may expect that the positive impact of
higher public spending on tax morale decreases as one moves up the income distribution. To
test this, we formulate a ﬁnal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The positive eﬀect of higher public social spending on the demand for
tax morale decreases with income.
3 Dependent variables
The individual level data for our estimation analysis is from the ﬁrst four waves of the European
and World Values Survey (E/WVS). This survey contains information on basic attitudes, beliefs
and human values covering religion, morality, politics, work and leisure. In particular respondents
are asked to evaluate on a ten-point scale whether they think ‘claiming state beneﬁts which you
are not entitled to can always be justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed, or something in between’. The
10Bordignon (1993)p r o v i d e sat h e o r e t i c a lm o d e lw i t hap r e d i c t e de ﬀect of public expenditures that is in line
with empirical end experimental evidence.
8same question was asked for ‘cheating on tax if [they] have the chance’ [...]. We use these two
questions to construct our measure of beneﬁt and tax morale. Information about more than
75,000 respondents from 29 OECD member countries from 1982 to 2001 is available.11
[Insert Table1 around here.]
As can bee seen in Table1, overall, citizens show a slightly higher level of beneﬁt morale (8.84)
than of tax morale (8.48). Most of the large economies, such as the United States, Great Britain
and Japan, show values above the OECD average in both cases. Turkey, with means of 9.77 and
9.83, exhibits the highest level of both beneﬁt and tax morale in the OECD area. Other top
ten countries in both categories are Denmark, Czech Republic and Iceland. In contrast, Greece,
Portugal and Luxembourg are at the bottom of the list in both rankings. Citizens in Greece
have the lowest level of beneﬁt morale (7.03), and Belgians perform worst in tax morale (7.18).
The Spearman’s rank correlation between beneﬁt and tax morale (based on individual data)
is 0.44 and indicates that the issues are closely connected.12 Nevertheless, we obtain some
systematic diﬀerences on a country level. Whereas the average level of beneﬁt morale is above
that of tax morale in the majority of the countries we obtain six countries (Greece, Mexico,
Japan, France, Slovakia and Turkey) where the reverse is true (see column three in Table1 ).
The largest diﬀerences in average levels (in absolute terms) can be observed in Norway (1.52),
the Netherlands (1.43) and Belgium (1.41).
For the majority of the countries we can observe the development of beneﬁt and tax morale
over time. In most of the countries beneﬁt and tax morale are fairly stable over time.13 The
largest ﬂuctuations are observed in the case of Slovakia and Mexico.14 In our empirical analysis
below we will account for the diﬀerences across time and across countries.
4 Independent variables
In order to test our hypotheses we need information on individuals’ employment status, household
income, the tax burden and on public social spending. The E/WVS includes a large set of socio-
economic characteristics measured on an individual level which contains information on labour
11An overview of the number of observations over years and countries is given by TableA.2 in the Web Appendix.
12See also the scatter-plot in FigureA.4 in the Web Appendix.
13FigureA.5 and A.6 in the Web Appendix depict the evolution of average levels of beneﬁt and tax morale for
countries with four and three available observations over time separately.
14The large ﬂuctuations in Slovakia can be observed between the second wave (1991)a n dt h et h i r dw a v e( 1 9 9 8 ) .
This time span includes the transition of Slovakia as a part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to a separate
sovereign state in 1993. Mexico accounts for the largest ﬂuctuation between the second wave (1990)a n dt h e
fourth wave (2000).
9market status (employed, self-employed, unemployed or out of the labour force) and on household
income (measured on a ten-point scale). This allows us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The E/WVS, however, does not provide information on individuals’ tax burden or a measure
for the utility derived from public social spending. We therefore have to rely on average tax
rates and public social spending measured on a country level in order to test Hypotheses 3, 4,
and 5. To measure the tax burden we calculate eﬀective average tax rates, which are based on
a methodology inspired by Lucas (1990), developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) and reﬁned by
Volkerink and de Haan (2001). This is a well-known approach to measure the tax burden on
labour, capital and consumption on an internationally comparable level (OECD, 2000). This
method is based on aggregate data drawn from Revenue Statistics and National Accounts (see
Table A.3 in the Web Appendix). In order to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 we opt for public social
spending derived from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.
As control variables on an individual level we use the available information in the E/WVS
on age, sex, marital status, number of children, education (captured by school leaving age) and
size of place of residence (measured on a three-point scale). On a country level we control for
the population size, fertility rates and a number of macroeconomic indicators (GDP per capita,
inﬂation and the unemployment rate). Further details on all variables and data sources are
provided in SectionA.1 of the Web Appendix.
5 Multilevel model
Citizens in our data are clustered in countries in which they share a speciﬁc mix of ﬁscal policy,
political institutions, and macroeconomic conditions. Since we observe beneﬁt and tax morale
on an individual level and ﬁscal policy on a country level, we exploit information on both levels
to explain determinants of the morale motivation to comply.
This data structure is in fact very common. Whenever researchers are interested in the
eﬀects of state polices and institutions on individual outcomes (such as subjective measures) the
presence of such multilevel data poses a challenge to statistical analysis. Economists typically
meet this challenge by calculating Huber-White (also called Sandwich or robust) standard errors
or by using averaged data. However, neither approach is satisfactory, and the more appropriate
technique of multilevel modelling – heavily used in other disciplines – is easily available.15
15The terms hierarchical model, mixed-eﬀect model and mixed model are often used as synonyms for multilevel
models. This class of models has a long tradition in educational science and bio-statistics. Steenbergen and Jones
10Multilevel models do not only account for intraclass correlation, but explicitly model the
association between individuals in the same cluster (country). It is a much stronger form of cor-
rection than simply calculating robust standard errors. In contrast to the method of correcting
standard errors, a multilevel analysis corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for the num-
ber of clusters and will therefore give diﬀerent point estimates (UCLA: Academic Technology
Services, 2008).
In particular, we consider a random intercept model, which is the simplest multi-level model
to account for the dependence among individuals nested in countries:
moraleij =  1 +  2xij + ⇣1j + "ij
=(  1 + ⇣1j)+ 2xij + "ij,
(1)
where ⇣1j ⇠ (0, ) and "ij ⇠ (0,✓), the permanent error component ⇣1j varies only between
countries j, and the transitory error component "ij varies over citizens i and countries j. The
sum of these two terms, ⇠ij = ⇣1j + "ij, is the total residual. The random intercept model can
be viewed as a model with a country-speciﬁc intercept  1 + ⇣1j, where ⇣1j is called a ‘random






  + ✓
. (2)
This within-country correlation measures the ‘closeness’ of citizens from the same country relative
to the closeness of individuals from diﬀerent countries. It is straightforward to include country
level covariates, such as wj:
moraleij =  1 +  2xij +  3wj + ⇣1j + "ij
=(  1 + ⇣1j)+ 2xij +  3wj + "ij.
(3)
Our two dependent variables are measured on a ten-point scale. Strictly speaking these are
ordinal measures. Therefore, we have also estimated multilevel proportional-odds models (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005) that account for the ordinal nature of our two dependent variables.
Since the qualitative results are equivalent (detailed estimation output is available upon request)
and the scale is rather large we will for the ease of presentation focus on conventional multilevel
(2002) give an excellent overview and illustrate why such models are valuable for empirical research in economics
and political science. Rice and Jones (1997)p r e s e n ta ni n t r o d u c t o r ya c c o u n to fm u l t i l e v e lm o d e l sa n dd e s c r i b e
how health economics research may beneﬁt from their use.
11models throughout the paper.16
It is important to note that, in principal, all our explanatory variables of primary interest are
subject to potential endogeneity concerns. In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity that
remains conditional on our set of control variables, we proceed in two steps. First, we replicate
our entire analysis based on a ﬁxed-eﬀects model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity at
a country level. Second, we present (for important sub-samples) an instrumental variable (IV)
estimation strategy for two of our four explanatory variables of primary interest. In particular,
we exploit exogenous variation in labour income due to ﬁrm size, and exogenous variation in
public social spending due to political fractionalisation. Ideally, we would also like to present
an IV estimation for the eﬀect of labour market status and tax rates, however, in these cases no
credible instrument variables are available. However, since all four variables represent the same
economic mechanism, we hope the reader is convinced by the robustness check based on two
variables. Given that all alternative estimation methods (i.e. the ﬁxed-eﬀects model and the IV
estimations) give qualitative results equivalent to those estimated by the multilevel models, we
present ﬁrst the results of the latter model, where we focus on the economic interpretation, and
report on the alternative models thereafter.
6 Estimation results
The main estimation results are summarized in Table2. The intraclass correlation ⇢ varies in
our eight speciﬁcations between 0.062 and 0.156; the mean is equal to 0.097. That means, that
on average 9.7 percent of variation in morale can be explained by country level factors. This
substantial intraclass correlation indicates clustering of morale in countries and, therefore, a
signiﬁcant country inﬂuence on individual morale.17
Speciﬁcation I provides clear evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Compared to em-
ployed citizens, those not employed have a statistically signiﬁcant lower level of beneﬁt morale
(minus 0.05 points). For tax morale the reverse is true, where non-employed citizens exhibit a
signiﬁcantly higher willingness to comply (plus 0.13 points). In both cases demand decreases
with the price, and we interpret this as ﬁrst evidence that morale motivation to comply is an en-
16As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003); Norton et al. (2004)t h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no fi n t e r a c t i o ne ﬀects in
nonlinear models is quite cumbersome and not fully demonstrative.
17The number of available observations varies across speciﬁcations, since country-level control variables – which
are introduced starting with the test of Hypothesis 3;t h eﬁ r s tt e s tt h a ti sb a s e do nv a r i a b l e sm e a s u r e do nt h e
country-level) are missing for some country-years. However, it can be noted that the results of the ﬁrst two
speciﬁcations are not sensitive to the inclusion of the country-level control variables and the exclusion of the
observations from the respective country-years.
12dogenous dimension. When we add in further speciﬁcations income as an additional explanatory
variable, statistical signiﬁcance of labour market status vanishes in the beneﬁt morale equation.
Here, one has to keep in mind that labour market status and income are correlated dimensions.
A further disaggregation of the two labour market status – where we distinguish between citizens
who are either out of labour force, unemployed, employed (i.e. wage earners) or self-employed –
is revealing.18 It turns out that citizens out of labour force, and those unemployed have a lower
beneﬁt morale compared to all type of employed citizens. The positive eﬀect of non-employment
on tax morale is, however, only driven by those out of labour force. The disaggregation of the
two types of employed citizens reveals that self-employed citizens exhibit a substantially lower
level of tax morale compared to wage earners (about minus 0.31 points). This can be explained
by extensive opportunities to evade taxes (i.e. high cost of tax morale) among the self-employed;
their income is less visible, their tax return (including many deductibles) is more complex, and
oﬀers in sum more opportunities to conceal income. This result mirrors Feinstein (1991) who
analyzed tax audit data and found that self-employed citizens were more likely to evade than the
average taxpayer. There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between those two groups’ ben-
eﬁt morale. Notably, the patterns found for the disaggregated labour market status are robust
across all speciﬁcations.
[Insert Table2 around here.]
In Speciﬁcation II we test our hypotheses on the eﬀect of income (Hypotheses 2a and 2b).
Under the presumption that both morale goods are normal goods, the prediction on the eﬀect of
income on beneﬁt morale is unambiguous. Income and substitution eﬀects operate in the same
direction, and we expect beneﬁt morale to increase with income. As predicted, our estimation
shows that a one point higher income (measured on a ten-point scale) is associated with an
improvement in beneﬁt morale of about 0.04 points. This result supports Hypothesis 2a.I nt h e
case of tax morale the income and the substitution eﬀect have opposite signs. Our estimation
results suggest that the substitution eﬀect dominates. This is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2b
(null). A one point increase in income reduces tax morale by about 0.02 points. The comparably
smaller eﬀect in the case of tax morale (compared to beneﬁt morale) is consistent with the
result on the normality of both goods. Again, this is clear evidence that morale motivation is
determined by prices. In other words, citizens rationalize their own deviant behavior. High-
income households have comparably more opportunities to commit tax evasion, probably exploit
18Detailed estimation output is provided in TableA.4 in the Web Appendix.
13them and consequently develop and report the attitude that cheating on taxes is more or less
justiﬁable. Since endeavors to fraudulently collect beneﬁts may be too risky, they abstain and
develop/report the attitude that claiming state beneﬁts to which one is not entitled, is a serious
oﬀense. The same reasoning, but vice versa, applies to low-income households.
In Speciﬁcation III we consider the eﬀects of the tax burden (Hypotheses 3 and 3b). With
respect to tax morale we have a clear prediction. An increase in the tax rate is equivalent to
an increase in the price of tax morale. Since the income eﬀect goes in the same direction, tax
morale should decrease with an increasing tax burden. As expected, we ﬁnd that a higher tax
rate on labour reduces tax morale signiﬁcantly. A one percentage point increase in the tax rate
on labour (sample means is equal to 32 percent) decreases tax morale by about 0.07 points.
We ﬁnd also some negative eﬀect of the tax rate on capital and consumption. With respect to
the eﬀect of tax rates on beneﬁt morale, we have an equivalent prediction, but based on the
income eﬀect only. Our empirical results show that citizens respond in a similar manner as
with tax morale. Higher taxes on labour and consumption decrease beneﬁt morale. The smaller
quantitative eﬀect of taxation of labour for beneﬁt morale (compared to that of tax morale) may
reﬂect that the former results is only driven by an income eﬀect. Just in case of taxes on capital
we ﬁnd against our expectation a positive eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. Nevertheless, in sum, we
interpret these results as evidence in favor of Hypotheses 3 and 3b. If the tax burden is perceived
to be, high citizens adjust their morale motivation to comply and seem to view both tax evasion
and beneﬁt fraud as tools to restore purchasing power. This has important policy implications.
For instance, increasing the tax rate as a strategy to increase tax revenues can be (among other
factors) counterproductive, if citizens respond with suﬃciently low compliance. Tax revenues
may increase by less than the amount hoped for and increased (unjustiﬁed) beneﬁt claims might
further aggravate the budget crisis.
In Speciﬁcation IV we introduce the level of total public social spending as an additional ex-
planatory variable in order to capture the eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare state (Hypotheses
4a and b). It turns out that the level of public social spending has no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on beneﬁt morale.19 That means, we do not ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 4a. Theoretically
it is possible that the income and the substitution eﬀect cancel each other out. For tax morale
we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of public social spending on its demand. An increase in public social
spending by one percentage point (sample mean is equal to 19.44 percent) is associated with an
19Halla et al. (2010)ﬁ n das m a l lp o s i t i v ee ﬀect of public social spending on beneﬁt morale. The authors (as
well as Heinemann, 2008)s t r e s s ,h o w e v e r ,a d v e r s em e d i u ma n dl o n gr u ne ﬀects.
14increase in tax morale by 0.03 points. This result supports Hypothesis 4b. This eﬀect may be
solely driven by an income eﬀect and/or highlight that citizens recognize the important role of
exchange (i.e. they forgo private purchasing power in return for publicly provided goods, such
as a social welfare state). The latter eﬀect would reject the classical supposition that taxpayers
perceive their relationship with the state only as one of coercion.
In Speciﬁcation V we add an interaction term between public social spending and income
(both variables are mean centered) in order to test Hypothesis 5. Given that citizens at the top of
the income distribution will, in expectation, beneﬁt less from a generous welfare state, we expect
the positive impact of higher public spending on tax morale to decrease with rising income. Put
diﬀerently, we expect a negative sign for the interaction term. Indeed, we ﬁnd that a statistically
signiﬁcant negative interaction term. Our estimations suggest that an increase in public social
spending (at its mean) by one percent of GDP, increases tax morale of citizens at the bottom of
the income distribution by 0.04 points, and has basically no impact (plus 0.006 points) on the tax
morale of citizens at the top of the income distribution. In the case of beneﬁt morale, we observe
a similar pattern, however, the eﬀects are very small along the whole income distribution; the
average eﬀect of public social spending on beneﬁt morale is statistically insigniﬁcant.
In a ﬁnal step we extend Speciﬁcation V by control variables for the composition of total public
social spending in our two estimations; detailed estimation output is available upon request.
The qualitative results hardly change due to this additional control variables, with the exception
of the eﬀect of total public social spending on beneﬁt morale, which increases somewhat in
signiﬁcance.20
The results on all individual level control variables are robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Both beneﬁt and tax morale are higher among older citizens, females, married and those residing
in smaller towns. Higher educational attainment is positively related to beneﬁt morale, but has
not signiﬁcant impact on tax morale. These results are in accordance with earlier studies on tax
morale (see, for instance, Torgler and Schaltegger, 2006) and beneﬁt morale.
20We follow here the OECD terminology of social purpose and distinguish between spending shares on nine
core policy areas: old age, survivors, incapacity-related beneﬁts, health, family, active labour market policies
(ALMP), unemployment, housing and other social policy areas. This estimations also reveals that citizens on
average dislike spending in the category old age (the base group). An increase in spending on all other groups
(survivor, incapacity, health family, ALMP and on the residual category) at the expense of old age improves the
average citizen’s beneﬁt and tax morale. The only category which is less popular than old age is unemployment.
Shifting resources from old age to unemployment related expenditures worsens citizens’ beneﬁt morale. Detailed
estimation output is available upon request.
157 Sensitivity analysis
We test the sensitivity of our results to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and methods.
Firstly, we estimate a ﬁxed-eﬀects model by introducing country ﬁxed-eﬀects. Thereby, we con-
trol for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the country level. Table3 provides estimation
output for Speciﬁcation V.21 It turns out that our results are very robust to this modiﬁcation. We
do not observe any important diﬀerences compared to results discussed above at the individual
nor at the country level.
[Insert Table3 around here.]
Secondly, we suggest an IV estimation strategy for two of our four explanatory variables of
primary interest. First we instrument for income. Given our ﬁnding that tax morale deteriorates
with income, one could argue that this relation might be due to reversed causality, namely that
after-tax income increases if tax morale decreases. We utilize here a robust empirical ﬁnding
from the labour economics literature (Oi and Idson, 1999) stating that earnings are higher in
larger ﬁrms, and instrument income with ﬁrm size (captured by the number of the respondent’s
co-workers). The identifying assumption is that the number of co-workers is not related to other
unobserved determinants of individual tax morale. One drawback of this empirical strategy
is that it applies to the employed citizens only, and that the information on the number of
co-workers is available only for a subset of observations (3,768 observations from 18 countries).
However, given the fact that a credible instrument it is hard to ﬁnd, we accept this trade-oﬀ. The
power of the our instrument is conﬁrmed by a suﬃciently high Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic of
11.66 in the ﬁrst stage of our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation procedure. In the second
stage (summarised in Table4) we ﬁnd again a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of income
on tax morale of minus 0.547 points; which is comparable larger than the initial estimate.
[Insert Tables4 and 5 around here.]
Second, we instrument for total public social spending. Here we follow Halla et al. (2011)
and use political fractionalisation (i.e. the number of relevant parties involved in the legislative
process) captured by the so-called Rae-Index as an instrument.22 We have to assume that
21Estimation output for more speciﬁcations is available in the Web Appendix (see TableA.5).
22Halla et al. (2011) show that (controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across countries) higher
political fractionalisation in OECD member countries leads to signiﬁcantly lower public (social) spending and
use this ﬁnding to identify the causal eﬀect of public (social) spending on diﬀerent demographic outcomes. The




i,w h e r esi is the share of seats for party i and n the number of parties (Rae,
1968). That means, a higher value of the Rae-Index indicates a more fractionalised system.
16the number of relevant political parties involved in parliament aﬀects individual beneﬁt and
tax morale only through the channel of total public social spending. The 2SLS estimation
summarised in Table5 (based on 58,332 observations from 22 countries with a strong ﬁrst stage)
shows a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of total public social spending on beneﬁt and tax
morale (plus 0.197 and 0.231 points, respectively). This conﬁrms our results presented above.
8 Summary & conclusions
Our results suggest the motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via beneﬁt fraud and tax
evasion evolve endogenously in the sense that these social norms are determined by prices (i.e.
by the cost of acting morally). Citizens who have comparably more opportunities and low cost
to commit a certain oﬀense, develop the attitude that it is a minor oﬀense. This suggests that
citizens excuse or rationalize their own deviant behavior. Put diﬀerently, citizens self-servingly
adjust their morale values. From a policy perspective it is beneﬁcial to know that by aﬀecting
the price of a certain oﬀense (for instance, via the tax rate or the generosity of certain welfare
arrangements), there might be an additional eﬀect on the underlying moral motivation to abstain;
which in turn will aﬀect compliance behavior. That means, our ﬁndings point at a more general
phenomenon which policy makers should be aware of when attempting to increase (decrease)
the demand of goods with positive (negative) externalities. In each case policy makers have to
consider also an impact of the policy on respective social norm.
Finally, our results can also be interpreted on the basis of the motivation crowding theory,
which suggests that individuals diﬀerentiate between two diﬀerent sources of motivation: incen-
tives applied from outside (extrinsic motivation) and their ‘inner feelings’ (intrinsic motivation).
Intrinsic motivation is an endogenous dimension, and a change in the level of the extrinsic moti-
vation may alter the level of intrinsic motivation as well. In general, it is not clear in which way
an external intervention will aﬀect intrinsic motivation. We have shown that in the context of
beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion the intrinsic motivations to comply (i.e. beneﬁt and tax morale)
are indeed altered by extrinsic factors, such as tax rates.
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20Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Mean of beneﬁt morale, tax morale, and their diﬀerencea
Benefit Tax
Morale Morale Difference
Australia 9.31 (1.55) 8.52 (2.33) 0.79 (2.29)
Austria 9.14 (1.61) 8.97 (1.82) 0.17 (1.86)
Belgium 8.59 (2.15) 7.18 (2.98) 1.41 (3.18)
Canada 9.08 (1.86) 8.80 (2.17) 0.28 (2.21)
Czech Republic 9.26 (1.44) 9.09 (1.67) 0.18 (1.74)
Denmark 9.57 (1.21) 8.76 (2.06) 0.82 (2.17)
Finland 8.64 (1.94) 8.42 (2.32) 0.21 (2.34)
France 7.67 (2.58) 7.99 (2.66) -0.32 (3.06)
Germany 8.95 (1.90) 8.36 (2.35) 0.59 (2.12)
Greece 7.03 (2.73) 7.81 (2.49) -0.78 (3.21)
Hungary 8.76 (2.46) 8.39 (2.68) 0.37 (2.07)
Iceland 9.39 (1.31) 8.75 (2.01) 0.65 (2.06)
Ireland 9.15 (1.67) 8.37 (2.33) 0.79 (2.25)
Italy 9.17 (1.72) 8.69 (2.15) 0.47 (2.18)
Japan 9.02 (1.82) 9.53 (1.33) -0.51 (1.84)
Luxembourg 8.16 (2.39) 7.84 (2.71) 0.31 (3.18)
Mexico 7.17 (3.04) 7.95 (2.66) -0.78 (3.32)
Netherlands 9.53 (1.21) 8.11 (2.33) 1.43 (2.37)
New Zealand 9.21 (1.69) 8.68 (2.21) 0.53 (2.10)
Norway 9.52 (1.13) 8.00 (2.49) 1.52 (2.55)
Poland 8.76 (1.96) 8.63 (2.19) 0.13 (2.49)
Portugal 8.22 (2.67) 7.24 (3.13) 0.98 (3.42)
Slovakia 8.27 (2.24) 8.59 (2.12) -0.32 (2.14)
Spain 8.64 (2.33) 8.62 (2.16) 0.02 (2.56)
Sweden 9.11 (1.65) 8.69 (2.01) 0.42 (2.14)
Switzerland 8.92 (2.08) 8.56 (2.28) 0.36 (2.67)
Turkey 9.77 (0.96) 9.83 (0.88) -0.06 (1.17)
United Kingdom 9.18 (1.64) 8.48 (2.23) 0.70 (2.09)
United States 9.20 (1.71) 9.06 (1.86) 0.14 (1.92)
8.84 (1.88) 8.48 (2.23) 0.36 (2.37)
a A graphical depiction of these country averages is provided in the Web Ap-
pendix: FiguresA.1, A.2 and A.3 show the average level of beneﬁt morale, tax









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 3: Determinants of beneﬁt and tax morale (country ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation)a
Speciﬁcation V
Dependent variable BM TM
Hypotheses 1a & 1b
Non-employed  0.027 (0.020) 0.108*** (0.023)
Hypotheses 2a & 2b
Income 0.042*** (0.003)  0.015*** (0.004)
Hypotheses 3a & 3b
Tax rate on labour  0.018*** (0.007)  0.071*** (0.008)
Tax rate on capital 0.004** (0.002)  0.002 (0.002)
Tax rate on cons.  0.039*** (0.010)  0.039*** (0.012)
Hypotheses 4a, 4b & 5
Social exp.  0.010 (0.009) 0.018* (0.011)









No. of observations 66,540 66,540
No. of countries 27 27
a Method of estimation is a ﬁxed-eﬀects model. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **
and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and
1-percent level, respectively. BM stands for beneﬁt morale, and TM for tax morale.
The variables social exp. and income are mean centered. These variables and their
interaction are jointly statistically signiﬁcant (P-value< 0.001). b Individual level con-
trol variables comprise information on respondent’s age, sex, marital status, number
of children, education (captured by school leaving age) and size of place of residence
(measured on a three-point scale). c Time ﬁxed-eﬀects are binary variables for each
wave of the E/WVS. d Country level control variables comprise macroeconomic indi-
cators (GDP per capita, inﬂation and the unemployment rate) and population control
variables (population size and fertility rate).




No. of observations 3,768
No. of countries 18
a The dependent variable is tax morale. Method
of estimation is two-stage least squares. Income
is identiﬁed by the exclusive restriction of the
number of co-workers (i.e. by ﬁrms size). The
estimation controls for respondent’s age, sex,
marital status, number of children, education
(captured by school leaving age) and size of place
of residence (measured on a three-point scale).
Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent
level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respec-
tively.
23Table 5: Instrumenting for public social spendinga
Dependent variable BM TM
Hypotheses 1a & 1b
Non-employed  0.028 (0.021) 0.107*** (0.025)
Hypotheses 2a & 2b
Income 0.039*** (0.003)  0.026*** (0.004)
Hypotheses 3a & 3b
Tax rate on labour  0.059*** (0.009)  0.097*** (0.010)
Tax rate on capital 0.005** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Tax rate on cons.  0.050*** (0.011)  0.028** (0.012)
Hypotheses 4 &, 4b









No. of observations 58,332
No. of countries 22
a Method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Public social spending (Social exp.)
is identiﬁed by the exclusive restriction of the so-called Rae-Index.T h e R a e - I n d e x
is deﬁned as 1  
Pn
i=1 s2
i, where si is the share of seats for party i and n the num-
ber of parties (Rae, 1968). That means, a higher value of the Rae-Index indicates a
more fractionalized political system. Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent
level, respectively. BM stands for beneﬁt morale, and TM for tax morale. b Individual
level control variables comprise information on respondent’s age, sex, marital status,
number of children, education (captured by school leaving age) and size of place of res-
idence (measured on a three-point scale). c Time ﬁxed-eﬀects are binary variables for
each wave of the E/WVS. d Country level control variables comprise macroeconomic
indicators (GDP per capita, inﬂation and the unemployment rate) and population
control variables (population size and fertility rate).
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